Chessville Reviews - Curaçao 1962 (The Battle of Minds that Shook the Chess World) - by GM Jan Timman - Reviewed by Michael Jeffreys and Prof. Nagesh Havanur

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Curaçao 1962
The Battle of Minds That Shook the Chess World
Reviewed by Prof. Nagesh Havanur

by Jan Timman

New in Chess, 2005

ISBN 9056911392

224 Pages, softcover

Figurine Algebraic Notation

More than four decades after Curacao 1962, the passionate debate over the tournament that changed the course of chess history rages as fiercely as ever. Not the least because some of its protagonists like Fischer, Korchnoi and Benko are still in our midst. It all began with Fischer's article: The Russians Have Fixed World Chess which appeared in Sports Illustrated magazine soon after the Curacao event. It was reprinted in Life Magazine later. The thrust of his accusations was that the Soviet GMs Petrosian, Keres and Geller made suspiciously short draws among themselves and aligned themselves against him. [Editor's Note: See also: Did the Soviets Collude?: A Statistical Analysis of Championship ...]

Jan Timman’s book supports the main point of Fischer’s allegations, while pointing out that Bobby's other charges, like Korchnoi throwing his games to his compatriots, were wide of the mark.

What is not so well-known today (Timman also seems unaware of it) is that Keres did make a belated response in passing to Fischer's accusations of Soviet collusion in his Thoughts On The Current Chess Scene in the May 1964 issue of Chess, Sutton Coldfield Magazine. In the article Keres denied all the allegations. Indeed, he pooh-poohed Fischer's claim that he posed a serious challenge to the Soviets.

Unfortunately, Keres's own record and the tournament score table belied his claims. He lost only two games, to Fischer and Benko. In the last round he failed to win against Fischer. A victory would have enabled him to win the Candidates' Tournament and challenge Botvinnik. He had been striving for it since 1948.

What is more, contrary to his denials, the Soviets did take Fischer’s challenge seriously. He had won the Stockholm Interzonal ahead of them. Indeed, it was Petrosian who let the cat of the bag in a candid admission:

"During the flight from Moscow to Curacao, Keres and I spoke about Fischer, and we arrive at the shared conclusion that the most the young American could count on at this moment was third place. Geller was of the same opinion. The results of the tournament showed that we had not been far from the truth." (Russians versus Fischer, Edited By Plisetsky and Voronkov, p.83.)

In other words, each of the trio inwardly expected one of the other two to lose to Fischer unless there was going to be a tie. Both Petrosian and Geller hoped that Keres, the oldest participant would not be able to withstand the strain of the marathon race of 28 rounds.

Keres himself was aware that the age factor was against him. In an interview during the tournament he was asked about his uncharacteristically staid play and he had replied, “Why should I take risks? In the 1959 Challengers’ Tourney I took chances and it didn’t work. Now I am trying the other way round.”

The die was cast by the penultimate round. Keres, who had led the tournament all along with Petrosian, was paired against the tail-ender, Benko. In the normal course he would have easily held against him. As a matter of fact, he had beaten the American in as many as three encounters in this tournament. But the Estonian was a bundle of nerves and exhaustion. He was comprehensively outplayed, and the game was adjourned in a completely lost position for him. Yet Petrosian and Geller did not want to take any chances as Keres’ powers of analysis were legendary. Hence, their perfidy in offering to help Benko before the resumption of the game. It is beside the point that Benko did not need their help and won the game soon after resumption. Keres had paid dearly for the alliance with the duo. Timman corroborates the whole story. (On Benko’s own version in his recent autobiography, see the review of Pal Benko: My Life, Games and Compositions.)

Did Petrosian deserve to win the tournament? In terms of positional understanding and technical accuracy he always had that extra edge over others in this tournament. Not surprisingly he had a lost position only once (against Benko) in the entire event. His self-control, patience and pragmatism won out in the end. "After the tournament was over, some curious figures came to light; it turned out that in 27 games Petrosian had made 839 moves, Keres 924 and Geller 945. Petrosian had expended little more than 48 moves over his games, Keres and Geller ,59 hours each, Korchnoi 72 hours and Benko 78! ‘(Tigran Petrosian: His Life and Games by Vik .L. Vasiliev, p.113)

As for Timman’s annotations in this book, they are rather brief and sketchy in a number of games. But what matters most is his judgment and insight into the character of the player and the position. When he deals with an important encounter, invariably he focuses on the turning point that could have altered the course of the game and changed the result. The force of his analytical powers is felt in his commentary on games like the following:

Tigran Petrosian - Miroslav Filip [D37]
Rd 14, Curacao, 24 May 1962

1.c4 e6 2.Nc3 d5 3.d4 Be7 4.Nf3 Nf6 5.Bf4 0–0 6.e3 c5 7.dxc5 Bxc5 8.a3 Nc6 9.Qc2 Be7

Nowadays the sharper variation 9...Qa5 10.0–0–0 is preferred.

10.Rd1

The Soviet analysts suggested another variation here: 10.cxd5 exd5 11.Be2 Bg4 12.0–0.

10...Qa5 11.Nd2 e5 12.Bg5 d4 13.Nb3 Qd8

After 13...Qc7 Sokolsky recommended 14.Nb5?! Qb8 15.exd4 a6 16.Nc3 exd4 17.Rxd4 Qe5+ 18.Be3 Bf5‚ But Timman rightly suggests the intermediate move 14.Bxf6 Bxf6 15.Nd5± with a strategically superior position.

14.Be2 Ng4

The Soviet analysts offered a different line: 14...Be6 15.0–0 Rc8. Timman suggests 14...a5.

15.Bxe7 Qxe7 16.exd4 Qh4 17.g3 Qh3 18.d5 Nd4 19.Nxd4 exd4 20.Rxd4 Qg2?

Missing 20...Re8! 21.Re4 Bd7. After 22.Bf1 Timman suggests 22...Qh6 (instead of 22...Qh5? which allows 23.h3) with compensation for the material.

21.Qe4! Qxf2+ 22.Kd2 Nf6 23.Qe3 Qg2 24.Qg1!

The rival queen is unceremoniously driven out.

24...Qh3 25.Rh4 Qd7 26.Qd4 Re8 27.Bd3 b6

The book mistakenly gives 27...g6??.

28.Rf1!

Here Filip resigned. White is a pawn up with a raging attack. Timman offers no further analysis. My silicon friend offers the following variations:

28...Qe7 29.d6 Qe5 30.Rxf6 gxf6 31.d7 Bxd7 32.Qxd7 Rad8 33.Qg4+ Kf8 34.Qe4 Qg5+ 35.Qf4+-; or 28...Qd6 29.Ne4 Nxe4+ 30.Bxe4 h6 31.Rhf4 Re7 32.Bc2 threatening 33.Qd3. White has a won position.

One weakness of Timman’s writing is his occasional reliance on a secondary source when the player’s own account of the game is not available or overlooked. A case in point is the following game:

Robert Fischer - Viktor Korchnoi [B09]
Rd 5, Curacao, 8 May 1962

1.e4 d6 2.d4 Nf6 3.Nc3 g6 4.f4 Bg7 5.Nf3 0–0 6.Be2

6.Bd3 is the modern preference.

6...c5 7.dxc5 Qa5

Not 7...dxc5?! 8.Qxd8 Rxd8 9.e5±

8.0–0

Not 8.cxd6?! Nxe4 9.dxe7 Re8.

8...Qxc5+ 9.Kh1 Nc6 10.Nd2

Timman prefers 10.Qe1, intending to take the queen to h4.

10...a5!

A suggestion of Vasyukov who had persuaded Korchnoi to try this line against Fischer. In an earlier game, Nikitin-Bondarevsky 1958, White was better after 10...Nd4?! 11.Nb3 Nxb3 12.axb3 Bd7 13.e5 dxe5 (13...Ne8? 14.Be3 Qxe3 15.Nd5 Qc5 16.b4 Qc6 17.Nxe7++-) 14.fxe5 Qxe5 15.Bf4 Qc5 16.Bf3±

11.Nb3

11.Nc4?! threatening 12.Be3 Qb4 13.a3 winning the queen is not good enough on account of 11...Bg4! 12.Be3 Qxc4! liquidating to a favourable ending according to Timman. ( Not 11...Ng4?! 12.Nd5 Nf2+ 13.Rxf2 Qxf2 14.Be3 Qh4 15.Ncb6 Rb8 16.Nxc8 Rfxc8 17.g3 Qh6 18.f5 g5 19.Qd2 Bf6 (19...Bxb2 ? 20.Bxg5 Qg7 21.Rf1±) 20.h4 with initiative.

11...Qb6 12.a4

Not 12.Nd5? Nxd5 13.exd5 a4 14.dxc6 axb3 15.cxb7 Rxa2! 16.bxc8Q Rxc8 17.Bd2 bxc2 18.Qe1 Rxa1 19.Qxa1 Bxb2–+

12...Nb4

Threatening...Be6.

13.g4?

13.Bf3 is also bad on account of … Be6 threatening...Nxc2. After 14.Nd4 Bc4 or 14.Nd2 Rac8 Black has powerful pressure according to Timman.

Korchnoi recommends 13.Nd2! Now not 13...d5?! 14.e5 Ne4 15.Ncxe4 dxe4 16.c3 Nd3 17.Nxe4 Nxc1 (17...Nxb2 ? 18.Qd4 !) 18.Qxc1± Bf5 with feeble compensation for the pawn.; Black should play 13...Be6 14.f5 with a sharp position.

13...Bxg4! 14.Bxg4 Nxg4 15.Qxg4 Nxc2 16.Nb5

Not 16.Qd1? Qxb3 17.Ra3 Qc4! –+.

Korchnoi points out that attack with 16.Nd5 does not work: 16...Qxb3 17.Nxe7+ Kh8 18.f5 Nxa1 19.f6 Bxf6 20.Rxf6 Rfe8 21.Nd5 Qc4! 22.Nc3 Nb3 23.Bh6 Kg8 24.Qf4 Nc5 25.Rxd6 Nxe4–+

16...Nxa1 17.Nxa1 Qc6 18.f5!

Fischer rightly tries for a kingside attack, otherwise the position is lost.

18...Qc4 19.Qf3 Qxa4 20.Nc7 Qxa1 21.Nd5?

Here Timman's analysis does not go far enough. White should have accepted the challenge by capturing the rook with the knight according to Korchnoi. In his book My Best Games, Volume 2: Games With Black (Olms Edition, 2001) he analyses 21Nxa8! Rxa8 22.fxg6 fxg6. Now not 23.Qf7+ Kh8 24.Qxe7 (Timman only mentions 24.Bh6? Qxb2–+) 24...Qb1! (Korchnoi also claims that White stands much worse after 24...Qa4? He forgets his own remarkable analysis in his Russian work, Izbrannie Partii (St.Petersburg,1996) 25.Be3 Re8 26.Bd4!!

Analysis Diagram: after 26.Bd4

26...Rxe7?? 27.Rf8# #) 25.Qxb7 Re8 26.Re1 Qd3 and Black has the superior position.

In stead White should play 23.Qb3+! 23...Kh8 24.Qxb7 Rg8 25.Qxe7 (25.Qb3 is also possible.) and he has chances of saving the game.

21...Rae8 22.Bg5

The attempt 22.Bh6?! Qxb2 23.Nxe7+ Rxe7 24.Bxg7 fails to 24...f6!–+ according to Korchnoi.

22...Qxb2 23.Bxe7

Here the veteran American GM Edmar Mednis offers an attractive continuation similar to the game: 23.Nxe7+?! Rxe7 24.Bxe7 Be5! 25.Rf2 Qc1+ 26.Kg2 Re8! 27.fxg6 Rxe7–+

23...Be5! 24.Rf2 Qc1+ ( –+ ) 25.Rf1 Qh6 26.h3 gxf5 27.Bxf8 Rxf8 28.Ne7+ Kh8 29.Nxf5 Qe6 30.Rg1 a4 31.Rg4 Qb3 32.Qf1 a3 33.Rg3

Now Korchnoi wants to have some fun.

33...Qxg3! 0–1

Perhaps Fischer hoped for a perpetual check after 33...Bxg3. As Edmar Mednis points out, this also fails after 34.Nd4 Qe3! 35.Qf6+ Kg8 Now White cannot play 36.Nf5?? as he will be mated after 36...Qf3+

The tournament was a nightmare for Tal who was hospitalized and had to withdraw midway through the tournament. The ailing Latvian had fleeting moments of fantasy which could not materialize over the board.

Mikhail Tal - Paul Keres [C96]
Rd 16, Curacao, 2 June 1962

1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nc6 3.Bb5 a6 4.Ba4 Nf6 5.0–0 Be7 6.Re1 b5 7.Bb3 0–0 8.c3 d6 9.h3 Na5 10.Bc2 c5 11.d4 Nd7

The Keres Variation. Black plays for the control of he point e5. The knight also vacates the f6 square for the occupation of the bishop. Keres had lost with this variation to Fischer in Round 7. The famous encounter is included in Fischer's book My 60 Memorable Games.

12.Nbd2 cxd4 13.cxd4 Nc6 14.a3

Too hesitant in Timman's opinion. He prefers other alternatives like 14.d5, 14.Nf1 or 14.Nb3.

14...exd4 15.Nb3 Nde5 16.Nfxd4 Bf6 17.Bd2

In Timman's opinion the variation 17.Nxc6 Nxc6 18.f4 followed by 19.Qd3 does not give White any advantage on account of 18...Be6 and Black has an excellent position; instead he recommends 17.Rb1 preparing the development of the bishop on c1.

17...Nxd4 18.Nxd4 Nd3 19.Nc6?!

Keres: 'Tal tries for the greatest possible complications in every position....The combination initiated by the text move is indeed very complicated, but it eventually turns to Black's advantage.' 19.Bxd3 Bxd4 20.Qc2 Qf6 21.Bc3 Bxc3 22.Qxc3 Qxc3 23.bxc3 Be6 24.a4=

19...Nxf2!

Here Timman quotes Tal. In The Life and Games of Mikhail Tal Tal has this to say about this moment: :'I thought up a very interesting combination and after making a preparatory move. I even went up to Perosian and joked, "I am going for the brilliancy prize." The point was that in my preliminary calculations I was planning to sacrifice my queen for only two minor pieces. But after writing Qh5, which could have led to the sacrifice, I in stead changed my mind and played Qf3, forgetting about Black's obvious reply. Within two moves, not a trace of my attack remained, but I was a pawn down and soon had to resign.'

Timman is at a loss to understand why Tal changed his mind. Tal annotated this game in an issue of Shakhmaty magazine and it was here that he explained what went wrong with his calculations. The game with Tal's commentary may be found in the second volume of Kirilov's Russian work Mikhail Tal Games (1962–1967).

But what did Keres see in the position arising after 20.Qh5? The answer to this question may be found in the book Paul Keres: The Quest for Perfection (Edited by John Nunn, Batsford ,1997). Timman misses the analysis by both Keres and Tal, and he is also unaware of the analytical postscript by John Nunn in the Keres anthology. In spite of these limitations he discovers the right riposte to White's audacious attack and remarkably enough, reaches the same conclusion as Keres:

20.Qh5
A) 20...Qb6 During the game Keres had intended this move. 21.e5 Ne4+ 22.Kh2
Now Black has two plausible continuations:
I.22…g6
II.22…Bxe5+
I. 22...g6 23.exf6 gxh5 24.Bxe4 Here my silicon friend suggests 24...Kh8 (Tal had only analysed 24...Bb7? 25.Ba5! Qxc6 26.Bxc6 Bxc6 27.Rad1±) 25.Ne7 Bb7 26.Bh6 Rg8 27.Nxg8 Rxg8 28.Bxb7 Qxb7 and it is White who has to think of defence.
II. 22...Bxe5+ 23.Nxe5 Nf6

Analysis Diagram: after 23...Nf6

Now John Nunn offers a remarkable line: 24.Bxh7+! (instead of 24.Qh4 suggested by Keres) 24...Nxh7 25.Ng6! fxg6 26.Qd5+ Kh8 27.Qxa8 Bb7 28.Qe8! Bxg2! (28...Rxe8?! 29.Rxe8+ Nf8 30.Rxf8+±) 29.Be3 Rxe8 30.Bxb6 Be4, and White is slightly superior. A phenomenal might-have-been.
B) 20...Nxh3+ !
The only right way of refuting White’s attack according to Keres and Timman.
After 21.Kh2 Black has 3 possible lines:
I.21…Be5 +
II.21…Qc7
III.21…g6!

I. 21...Be5+ 22.Qxe5 dxe5 23.Nxd8 Rxd8 24.Ba5. Tal had seen thus far in his calculations. Now he imagined the continuation 24…Nf4!?! 25.Bxd8 Rxd8!! (this illegal move is an optical illusion). So he changed his mind over 20.Qh5 and played the weaker 20.Qf3?
II. Timman analyses 21...Qc7? 22.e5 g6 23.exf6! (23.Qf3 suggested by Keres is not so convincing on account of 23...Bh4) 23...gxh5 24.gxh3 Qxc6 25.Be4 Qd7 26.Re3‚ with a probably decisive attack.
III. 21...g6! 22.Qf3 Be5+ 23.Nxe5 dxe5–+
Timman follows the same analytical path and endorses Keres's conclusion that this line refutes White's combination. Incidentally, 24.Bh6? is met by 24...Qh4!

What followed in the game in the game was an anticlimax.

20.Qf3? Nxh3+!

Tal is a dangerous adversary even when he makes weak moves. Not 20...Qb6?! 21.e5 Ng4+ 22.Be3 Nxe3 23.exf6! Nxc2+ 24.Kh1 Nxe1 25.Rxe1, and White has a dangerous attack.

21.Kh2 Be5+ 22.Nxe5

22.Kh1? Qh4! (22...Qc7 is also good.) 23.gxh3 Bg3 24.Ne7+ Kh8 25.Nxc8 Raxc8–+ -Keres.

22...dxe5 23.Red1

23.Bb4? Ng5!

23...Nf4! 24.g3

24.Bxf4? Qh4+!

24...Ne6 25.Bc3

25.Bb4? Nd4!

25...Qg5 26.Rd6

26.Rd5 Qh6+ 27.Kg2 Ng5‚and Black has a raging attack.

26...Qh6+ 27.Kg1

27.Kg2 Nf4+ 28.gxf4 Qxd6–+

27...Nd4 28.Rxh6

28.Rxd4? exd4 29.Bxd4 Qd2–+

28...Nxf3+ 29.Kf2 gxh6 30.Kxf3 Re8 31.Rh1 Kg7 32.Bb3 Bb7 33.Bd2 f5 34.Rxh6 Rad8 35.Rb6 Bxe4+ 36.Ke2 Bf3+ 37.Ke1 f4 38.Bc3 fxg3 39.Rxa6 Rd4 40.Ra7+

40.Bxd4 exd4+ 41.Re6 Rxe6+ 42.Bxe6 d3 43.Bf5 d2+ 44.Kxd2 g2–+

40...Kh6 41.Rf7 0–1

Here Tal resigned as any further resistance is hopeless after 41...Rf4.

The book has an engaging narrative and delightful photographs. It also has its share of blemishes. Botvinnik was an electrical engineer, and not an electronics engineer (p.12). Spassky beat Korchnoi in a Candidates Match, and not in a Candidates’ Tournament in 1968 (p.21). After all, the system of Candidates’ Tournament was abandoned on account of the controversy over Curacao 1962! But these slips should not deter us from reading a memorable account of an event that made history.